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Let us not tire of preaching love; it is the force that will overcome the world. Let us not tire of preaching love, though we see that waves of violence succeed in drowning its fire. Love must prevail, as only it can.—Archbishop Oscar Romero, 1977 1

Peace

"A Logical Plan for Peace" is tucked away as the next-to-last chapter of recent and excellent book by Heikki Patomaki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the Construction of World Politics.2 Most of the book deals with the technical issues in the methodology of social science research. I start my commentary about the book at the next-to-last chapter because violence threatens everybody, and, thus, peace is a topic in the best interest of everyone. The book as a whole, asks the question, How can social science best contribute to the building of peace? It answers the question by advocating research methods grounded in the philosophy of critical realism.

The next-to-last chapter builds on the peace research done by Karl Deutsch and his collaborators 3 (henceforth, Deutsch) in the 1950s. Their logical method was the study of peace via observing places where peace prevailed. Next, they studied the peacemaking process by noting times when peace did not prevail in those same places, then they examined the historical transition from violence to peace. It should be possible to derive a logical plan toward peace from the findings of such research. The plan would prescribe nurturing and strengthening the causes that produced peace in historical cases where a transition from violence to peace has been achieved.

Deutsch identified a number of cases to study, all of which were in the North Atlantic region, including peace between the United States and then British territory of Canada, Sweden and Norway and others. Although the initial focus was on wars between nation states, their findings have wider applications. I think, as I sense Patomaki does too, that some of the ideas they advance, such as the idea that peace results from integration, suggest ways to diminish violence at any level.

Deutsch published his results in his book Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. In it, the formation of political community refers to 1) the amalgamation of formerly independent political units under a common sovereign and 2) the process of integration of independent states into what the authors call a pluralist security community. In the latter, war between two nations becomes so unthinkable that neither side prepares for it by using the relationships of Canada to the United States and Norway to Sweden. Much of the Deutsch study applies, as well, to the prevention of civil war because the conditions that favor peaceful cooperation between nations are largely the same as those that make civil war within nations unlikely. The study applies secondarily to civil war as a defined object of study.4

The conclusions of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area are numerous, complex and hedged by methodological caveats. They cast doubt on some theories and common sense notions about how peace might be achieved, while they tend to confirm others such as

  • the theory that peace can be achieved by maintaining a balance of power among likely combatants—is not confirmed.
  • the neo-Hobbes theory—that an alleged war of all against all will only cease by granting a monopoly of the legitimate use of force to a single sovereign—is not confirmed.
  • the idea that people will unite when they are forced to unite by the threat of a common enemy is only partly true because the unions, thus, produced are temporary.
  • issues regarding armaments and military budgets, commonly known as peace issues and concerns about which peace movements take the lead, turn out to be of relatively minor importance in the peace-building processes, however
    • the related peace movement idea that wars will cease when cultures cease to glorify war and war becomes seen as reprehensible does have significance and
    • creative negotiations by leaders, which today might be classified as skill in conflict resolution or conflict transformation, have proven significant, as well.

The great weight of the evidence accumulated and analyzed by Deutsch, however, serves to support the principal conclusion that Patomaki cites in After International Relations. A security community (a peace) is established when the general expectation prevails that institutions, which provide means for peaceful change, will function reliably and effectively. This main conclusion is consistent with that reached more than a decade earlier by Quincy Wright who found in his massive study of the history of war that the principal cause of war (if indeed cause is the right word here) is the difficulty of organizing the institutions of peace.5

It would be misleading to say that Patomaki rests his case solely on the Deutsch evidence. The proposition that is providing reliable institutions for effecting peaceful change is the single most important key to establishing a security community. It is a proposition that Patomaki tended to believe in regardless, for several reasons. He found corroboration in the ideas of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.The meaning of the institutionalizing peaceful change takes form within the chapters wherein Deutsch studies the prospects of the North Atlantic area becoming a stronger multinational security community than it was in the 1950s. The decisive factors are 1) the compatibility of major values and 2) what the authors call, in several contexts, responsiveness.

In the North Atlantic area, the core values of a largely common way of life are those of democracy and a constitutional government under the rule of law. The authors cite as an example the experience of United States military personnel stationed in Western Europe who were tried for offenses committed there in European courts. The commitment to the rule of law was so similar in the United States and in Western Europe that no case existed in which the United States objected that its citizens were not given a fair trial.

Deutsch also points out that the United States was (in the 1950s) committed to a modified free enterprise economy, while the UK and other European nations tended toward democratic forms of socialism. The compatibility of values at the level of democracy and rule of law favored peace among the North Atlantic nations, even when their electorates supported different philosophies regarding the proper role of the government in the economy. Democratic constitutionalism provided the core compatible values in the North Atlantic case, which was the only case thence studied. For those reasons, the book does not determine whether peace is built by sharing any core values, some core values but not others, or, specifically, by sharing the values of democracy and the rule of law.

A second major factor often mentioned by Deutsch is what they call responsiveness. Deutsch was influenced by the cybernetic theories of society in vogue at the time.6 He tended to see government as a feedback loop that processed messages in which ever-changing groups expressed their ever-changing demands and then adjusted the system to better satisfy their demands. Where the outcome was peaceful amalgamation or integration, it was usually in large part because the system responded by providing for citizens what they wanted. Usually, they wanted more rights and liberties, more equality and more prosperity. International peace and social peace tended to overlap and to be enhanced by government action, which was mutually responsive to the needs of other countries (as in the Marshall Plan) and responsive to its own citizens. In the multinational security community of the North Atlantic there was an acceptance by the government of each country of substantial responsibility for 1) high and stable levels of employment, 2) rising standards of living and 3) security for most individuals against one or more hazards such as

  • old age and illness
  • workmen's accidents and unemployment
  • exorbitant rents and home prices and
  • excessive fluctuations in the prices of agricultural products.

In the United States, these trends have been associated with such legislation as the Social Security Act of 1935 and its subsequent extensions of the 2) the Employment Act of 1946, 3) various items of housing legislation and 4) a succession of farm price support bills.

Broadly similar legislation with similar social effects has been enacted in all countries belonging to the first and second of our income groups in the North Atlantic area. The particular items covered have varied, of course, from country to country and so has the manner in which each particular problem was dealt with in each case. In their cumulative effect, however, these changes have been astonishingly similar—not the less so for being accepted in their essentials by conservative as well as liberal and labor parties in most of the countries concerned.7 The authors quote from an earlier study by P. E. Corbett who wrote:

The welfare of the individual in society should be recognized as an end in itself and the purpose of all organization nationally or internationally. The direct effort to promote it may also prove to be the speediest road to general and lasting peace.8

Although the institutions of the Political Community and the North Atlantic Area were formed nearly fifty years ago, Patomaki's references to it in After International Relations, published in December of 2001, are apt to the present day. At present, nine of ten wars are civil wars,9 and globalization is quickly eroding national sovereignty. Therefore, it is ever more evident that Deutsch is right to reject the so-called realist position (not to be confused with Patomaki's critical realism) in which war could be understood as the product of anarchy among sovereign states. Today, we need merely see the Palestinian experience to know that the failure of the legitimate processes that call for peaceful change will likely to lead to violence. Patomaki uses a diagram, simplified here, to illustrate his account of how peaceful change and, therefore, peace can be facilitated by the work of social scientists.

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Starting from the upper left side of the diagram is the emancipatory research that Patomaki advocates. It contributes to the self-transforming capacity of context as the ability of a society to change leads to dependable expectations for peaceful change, which leads to a security community as the assurance of peace.

Perhaps the most important and controversial point underlying Patomaki's diagram is that social science research can contribute to peaceful change by a systematic critique of current beliefs, which is what science does.10 Beliefs and the institutions that rest on them change, in part, because science demonstrates that the beliefs are false. Social contexts grow in self-transforming capacity as they grow in the ability to reconsider and revise currently held beliefs and as they better understand the causes of the unintended consequences of actions, which are based on them. Patomaki advocates a scientific form of nonviolence that is satyagraha, which is the force of truth. Thus, his logical plan for peace sets us in the middle of contemporary controversies concerning technical questions in the methodology of social science research.

My discussion of the technical questions have three stages: 1) a focus is on claims about knowing what is true.2) the questions about truth result in questions about structures, which 3) prove to be best understood in social science, as rules, relations and practices.

Truth

The work of authors associated with critical realism, such as Roy Bhaskar, Rom Harre, Elizabeth Anscombe, Mario Bunge, Karin Knorr Cetina (in important respects) and Patomaki rescue words such as truth, reality, cause and effect. Truth, (and the others) needs rescue from its current pariah status resulting from its association with such intrinsically pejorative concepts as totalizing, logo-centrism, metaphysics of presence, normalizing, essentialist, compulsory heterosexuality and onto-theology. Furthermore, some of the older notions used pejoratively to attack truth include: a meaningless metaphysics, a closed society, a dogma, an ideology and an inquisition.

For Patomaki's scientific nonviolence to work, peacemakers must be able to speak of the truth, or a truth, or a claim of rational truth, or something of the sort and contrast it with a belief, which may be widely held, even widely taken for granted, nevertheless, false. Speaking more generally, a number of intellectuals consider it important to reclaim reality, in Roy Bhaskar's phrase, as a necessary step in the process of emancipating humanity from dysfunctional and oppressive institutions.11

I will discuss one of the reasons why, in the 20th century, scholars of the democratic left have seen a political need to make a case against certain prominent forms of non-realism, 2) the reigning empiricism in the social sciences and 3) an important view of what it means to understand a text in the humanities. This brief discussion will introduce Patomaki's attempt to stake out critical realist principles, which at once rescues truth from its pariah status and orients social science toward the critique of social structures.

Let us suppose with Patomaki that 1) a main contribution of social science toward peace is to increase the effectiveness of the institutions organizing peaceful change, and 2) the method in which research can make institutions more effective is by finding truth, or something like truth, so that the rules and practices comprising the institutions become based on beliefs that are more appropriate to and based upon reality.

This second supposition may require more willing suspension of disbelief than a conscientious lover of wisdom would be willing to grant because, after all, social reality is ever-changing, infinitely varied and complex. Yet, the successes of the natural sciences demonstrate that human minds do not shrink or quake in the face of reality. When it comes to building a better mousetrap, or a guided missile pinpointed to destroy its target, human minds seem able to produce technologies that work because the principles they apply are true. As a result, the second supposition, in as much, says that a science of society is a viable discipline. This idea has been more than entertained in the past two centuries as the social sciences have flourished with millions of people who now have social science degrees and careers and the billions of dollars have been spent on social science research. Therefore, the idea that humans might learn to understand and create peace via learning truth has, at least, some plausibility. 

Let us put forth a third supposition that will clarify a point Patomaki presupposes. In a wise traditional formulation, human beings are a union of soul and body perpetually attracted both by the inspirations of love and by the temptations of self-interest. Consequently, social scientists, like all human beings are subject to not one but two golden rules with the other one being: those who have the gold make the rules. In this third supposition, it is likely that some sort of self-interest would become entrenched in methodological rules followed by mainstream social science research because self-interest is entrenched everywhere else. One means by which this could happen would be to create a standard methodology that explains and predicts social phenomena without calling into question the basic structures of society through which those who have the gold acquire the gold. It would look like science, though not do what science does that is systematically analyze existing beliefs in the name of truth.

Given that human nature is not entirely preoccupied with self-interest, it is no surprise to find an endless tug of war within social science faculties (each mind and heart, too). The tension is between 1) the technical research procedures that do not criticize social structures, though are conducive to successful fund-raising and 2) the intellectual consciences that recognize that war, poverty and the destruction of the biosphere will not end without calling into question the basic structures of society, through which—those who have the gold acquire the gold. What one would suspect from a basic knowledge of human nature, in fact, happens in social science as illustrated here.

In Macroeconomics in the Global Economy, a textbook by Jeffrey Sachs and Felipe Larrain, the syllabus includes the factors that cause high or low unemployment.12 The book makes no reference to the historical evolution of the moral and legal structures that make unemployment a chronic problem in all modern societies. Instead, census data, national accounts data, national and international labor statistics, prices, debts and quantities of money all dominate the textbook. The given information, which is the basis for learning to make calculations, is pre-interpreted in categories defined by existing institutions. Therefore, the text teaches the causes of unemployment only in the sense that the student explains and predicts unemployment by writing equations in which the substitution of constants for the independent variables that yields a value for the dependent variable.

Other examples are provided by Patomaki's discussion of the research tradition associated with J. David Singer's Correlates of War project. The most recent fruit is Triangulating Peace by Bruce Russett and John Oneal, which comments informally on a number of theories of peace, mainly Realpolitik and liberal-Kantian theories. The serious side of the book, however, lies not in its comments on theories, but in its scientific testing of theories. The authors operationally define the variables that Realpolitik and liberal-Kantian theories hypothesize as conducive to peace. They define peace (and war). They draw on datasets that count all known instances of peace and war from 1885 to 1992. They call their method epidemiological by analogy to probabilistic research in medicine, which tests the effects of drugs, or treatments, or nutrients by correlating the independent variable tested with dependent measures of health, calculating the probability: given x, then y will also be found.

Studies like Triangulating Peace feature exercises in retrodiction that is whatever the theory explaining peace might be, the empirical analyses testing the theory are statistical calculations. That is to say, given that one knows by assigning a number to a set of events in the past, equations can be derived and statistical tests can be run that connect those events to whether war occurred or whether there was peace. Peace is predicted, though it is not really predicted because it has happened. Thus, a hypothetical peace could have been predicted based on what went before it. The good news shows that Russett and Oneal's results prove that the liberal-Kantian variables of democracy, trade and international organizations predict peace to a level of statistical confidence equal to that found when using Realpolitik variables to predict peace. As found in the method used by Sachs and Larrain, explanation and prediction are achieved by analyzing datasets. The authors feel that they can confidently predict events by projecting such analyses into the future. They proclaim that—Peace will prevail throughout a region when all the states therein are democratic.13

From Patomaki's point of view, Russett and Oneal's confident prediction of future events is too confident. Critical realism maintains that in open systems predictions are, strictly speaking, impossible, although this does not mean that nothing can be anticipated. Patomaki points out that, even judged in terms of their own methodological standards, the statistical demonstrations of the democratic peace theory require massaging of the data. They require, for example, defining war in a way that does not include the covert operations by the United States to overthrow democratically elected regimes. More importantly, Patomaki holds that such studies should not be judged by their own methodological standards, but instead by the higher standards of a critical realist methodology.

In the philosophy of social science, methodologies for social science research such as those used by Sachs, Larrain, Singer, Russett, Oneal and others are justified in books like Nagel's The Structure of Science14 and Popper's The Poverty of Historicism.15 They argue for the unity of science claiming that there is no important methodological difference between natural science and social science. There is certainly, something that we recognize as understanding working in contrast to and distinct from explanation. Understanding, as a research method requires, as the etymology of its German equivalent implies—trying to stand in other peoples' shoes to see how the world looks to them.

From understanding, one learns the meanings for which acts, signs, symbols and relationships have for the actors and the people using the signs and symbols within the relationships. Nagel, Popper and other stalwarts of orthodoxy, however, view understanding not as a science. It may be a source of hypotheses for scientists to test, nevertheless it is not science. If you want to specialize in understanding for its own sake, then you must walk across the campus to the humanities building, where you will learn to interpret texts. Treating everything that is not science as hermeneutics and everything that is not understanding, thus, as explanation excludes a study of human action, which would have made structures visible by examining their construction in practice and in discourse.

The dichotomy of explanation in relation to understanding leaves the democratic left out in the cold. Mainstream explanation proceeds with no reference to any critique of the basic moral and legal structures of society. Its mainstream other is the humanistic study of the meanings found in life and in texts is an art form, which may be a fertile source of hypotheses to test; nevertheless, it is never, of itself, dynamic. Meaning, therefore, is never an influence as a variable, a force, or a factor.

To summarize this discussion of the epistemological plight of scholars on the democratic left, four assumptions appear as 1) social science builds the process to peace via the constructive criticism of institutions, 2) some sort of legitimate claim to scientific truth or accuracy is an essential part of constructive criticism, 3) human nature being what it is, powerful claims to monopolize scientific truth and accuracy have been asserted on behalf of social science research methodologies that systematically refrain from examining the basic moral and legal structures of society and 4) as shown through this hypothetical, suppose you are Habermas, Ricoeur, Giddens, Marcuse, Patomaki or some other conscientious left-leaning scholar. You are convinced that the institutionalization of peaceful change will not become a worldwide achievement until the basic structures of the modern world-system are substantially modified. From your view of this assumption, Sachs, Larrain, Singer, Russett, Oneal, Nagel, Popper and others—writing equations or doing statistical tests relating some socially constructed entities to others—are skating over the surface of reality. They never come to grips with the processes by which socially constructed entities become constructed. The structures they skate over are just the ones that need reconstruction to achieve peace and justice. It would then be politically important to you to take stands on technical issues in the methodology of social science research, which reject the dichotomy of explanation with understanding. You might write Knowledge and Human Interests,16 or Freud and Philosophy,17 or New Rules of Sociological Method,18 or One Dimensional Man,19 partly because you are looking for a way to assign causal powers to meanings. This consideration helps to explain why Patomaki in After International Relations repeats often and emphatically that meanings are causes. Seeing meanings as causes brings structures into view.

Establishing that meanings are causes is, however, more the background than the foreground of After International Relations. A more central concern of the book comes to terms with contemporary anti-realists who are convinced that claims by social scientists to know the truth, or even a truth, are specious claims in theory and likely to lead to oppression in practice. To that end, Patomaki outlines the three principles of critical realism:

  1. Ontological realism: some things exist as they are in the natural world and in society as the basis for claims of scientific truth
  2. Epistemological relativism: every claim to know the truth is fallible and subject to correction and truth is relative to the prejudices, chance circumstances, theoretical framework and the position in society of the person or group making the claim.
  3. Judgmental rationalism: some claims about truth are more rational than others and it is often possible to tell, with reasonable accuracy, which ones they are.

Principle 2 attempts to give contemporary antirealism its due, while principle 3 seeks to give it no more than its due. The first principle, the most fundamental of the three, represents a break with empiricism, insofar as empiricism takes the discovery of scientific laws as a matter of finding constant conjunctions among phenomena. For critical realists, the underlying structure is the object of study (what science is about) not the surface appearance or the phenomenon. The meaning of the title After International Relations is that mainstream international relations as an academic discipline was ill conceived. It took relations among nation states as its object of study and adopted Hume's empiricism, which had emerged near the time that the nation state emerged, as the main philosophy behind its research methods. The datasets of Singer, Russett and Oneal use updated math and statistics and, thus, refine Hume's phenomena (more precisely, Hume's impressions and Kant's intuitions).

Structure

How then are people to talk about those actual existing objects of scientific inquiry, which are not simple apparent phenomena, which one can see, name, rank order, scale, correlate and test for significance? Patomaki introduces an elaborate technical vocabulary, which is designed to be the terminology of the science of world politics, which is meant to supersede international relations. Most of the vocabulary is drawn from the realist philosophies of science of Roy Bhaskar and Rom Harre, while some is adapted from ideas of Anthony Giddens and other social scientists. Among the key, interrelated terms in Patomaki's technical vocabulary some of the most central include: causality, causal complex, relations and structure. I will focus on the concept of structure, about which Roy Bhaskar wrote:

The objects of scientific investigation are structures, not events. The structures exist and act independently of the conditions of their identification and, in particular, in open and closed systems alike. These structures are 1) non-empirical though empirically identifiable, 2) effective from one fact to another, though on the contingent that it manifests only in particular outcomes and 3) formative of the real basis for causal laws.20

The question about truth, therefore, becomes a question about structure if structure is the preferred 1) point of entry into Patomaki's complex of interrelated critical realist terms and 2) bridge leading to understanding how critical realism relates to other major approaches to social science. How can and/or will this contentious word be used in the social sciences? What effect does structure have on peacemaking and peace-building, which is conceived as achieving effective and reliable means for dealing with conflict and social change without violence?

Before I discuss Patomaki's views on how to think about structure, I will use the word structure in a few pages as if everyone knew what it means. I postpone the question about what it means in order to respond to a more important question: Why quibble? or, Why engage in questions that seem like quibbling?

If several theories converge to conclude that democracy leads to peace as Russett and Oneal point out, "Does it really matter whether this conclusion is reached using their methodology or Patomaki's?" Russett and Oneal even agree with Patomaki and Bhaskar that peace is the product of a laborious process of institution building and quote Quincy Wright who wrote—Peace is artificial, war is natural.21 They cite Deutsch who wrote that

In a security community, nations give up military violence and replace it with dependable expectations of peaceful change.22

Given that Sachs and Larrain never pretended to do the work of a Wallerstein or a Polanyi, is there any gain to point out their disregard of the eventual transformation of the current operations of the normative structures that they study? Given that critical realists and postmodernists alike hold that human institutions need to be invented because natural institutions are absent, does the realist's claim that structures have causal powers make a difference?

The questions just raised about quibbling have, I think, good answers. Patomaki does not go out of his way to quibble. Critical realism is an inclusive philosophy as it does acknowledge the findings of scientists who do not identify with it, or who do not employ the methods it recommends.

Furthermore, critical realism, which began as a philosophy of natural science, is not an exotic proposal for the use of untried methods. It claims to be a superior account of the history and practice of science and it aims to give an explanation of why science succeeds. One of the main theses of critical realism is that if no real structures of ontological value with causal powers existed, the success of science would be inexplicable.23 Critical realism is unlike the philosophies loosely called positivist, though it does not advocate a nomological-deductive method for the social sciences in putative imitation of the natural sciences, far from it.

It helps to discuss some issue areas where differences in methodology have clear practical consequences. With respect to the issue of the relationship of peace to democracy, Russett and Oneal's disagreements with Patomaki are, to a considerable extent, more academic than practical. Patomaki and Russett disagree about the merits and limitations of the statistical analysis of datasets. They differ about how best to further improve research methods with the aim of finding methods that, in general, become more reliable. With regard to the appeal of fostering democracy as a step toward peace, however, they propose concepts and methods for research that lead to similar policy proposals.

I will discuss four other issue areas, which regard the difference between the research for and about structures as causes and the research that disregards structures as causes, which is of great practical as well as academic significance. Using these four examples, I shall cast doubt on the adequacy of certain Humean social science procedures, often loosely called empiricist or positivist.24 I will assert that in these four areas, the research examining the basic structure of the modern world system has much to offer with important practical possibilities.

I have to add that neither Russett and Oneal nor Patomaki want their research to be used to promote simpleminded attempts to further liberal democracy everywhere. In a narrow view, the promotion of democracy can be a way to 1) impose the norms of a neoliberal capitalist economy, 2) constitute the non-democratic other as the enemy, 3) fan the flames of ethnic conflict and 4) delay real progress toward creating peace.

However, given that the authors under review resist drawing simplistic conclusions from the democratic peace theories, I assert that, in the light of the considerations discussed, Patomaki's critical realist approach prevails because it gives persuasive reasons why such simplistic conclusions should be avoided.

Capital flight

In the preface to the most recent edition of the journal Managing World Economic Change, Robert Isaak notes that capital flight is a peril every nation fears and is forced to take deterrence measures to as best it can.25 A subtext of it, however, is that given certain economic conditions that drive investors away, capital flight is as natural as windstorms and earthquakes. Therefore, capital flight is studied as a phenomenon that occurs under certain conditions and not others. Social scientists do empirical research to determine the conditions under which much of it happens.26 In capital flight, owners move their capital from a place where they fear they will lose it or where earnings are low and into a place where risk is lower and/or earnings are higher.

A strict empiricist methodology that skates over the surface of socially constructed realities can include 1) the naming of capital flight, 2) the rank-ordering and the scale of it, 3) correlating it with other phenomena and 4) testing relationships among variables relevant to capital flight for the significance of them. Other types of methodology, which may interpret more and calculate less, might be classified, using Anthony Giddens' concept of the double hermeneutics, as methods that accept the presupposed meanings to the phenomena of capital flight as made by non-social-scientists. These methods include:  

  • earnings as expressed in the language of accountants
  • ownership as defined by the law and by ordinary language and
  • risk as defined by insurers and by common sense. This class of methodologies then processes units of analysis defined by presupposed lay (nonscientific) meanings as operationally defined measurements, models, charts, graphs, metaphors, theories, hypotheses and the like. A theory illustrated with a graph, for example, might show a relationship between a measure of perceived risk and a measure of capital flight.
  • I suggest that there are some appropriate contexts for saying that a scientific discourse is about structure and that it ascribes causal powers to structure. The contexts are those where the layman meanings that are underlying capital flight are examined. One might first examine people who own capital and move it, which is more specifically, the freedom to move what one owns as one sees fit. The times when basic norms concerning property and free markets are rescued from the invisible background of social life and placed in the visible foreground are good times for saying the inquiry is structural. Therefore, a social science that examines structures as causes has more to say about capital flight than the Humean, who thinks of causes (or what would be causes if, in fact, cause exists) as constant union among phenomena.

    The race to the bottom

    In Globalization from Below, the authors define the race to the bottom via their observation that:— A destructive competition exists in which workers, communities and entire countries are forced to cut labor, social and environmental costs to attract mobile capital.27

    Capital flight is capital leaving and the consequent race to the bottom sacrifices social objectives to entice capital to come. In the race to the bottom, all levels of governments (and other structures) compete to attract investors. Usually (though not always) they compete by lowering the costs of doing business such as wages, taxes, environmental cleanup and so forth. Investors will usually give in to the lure of profitable deals, even when they have doubts about the ethics, morality and legality of the deals.

    Although I use only the word government in what follows, I added the parenthetical—and otherin the preceding paragraph because governments often do not have effective power. Sometimes a nation's competitive bids to attract investors are orchestrated more by military and or financial elites than governments. Others luring investors are the international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and aid consortia alone or in collusion with one or both of the military and financial elites.

    The reason I parenthetically added the phrase — though not always is that sometimes governments will compete to attract investment by raising the price on certain costs of business. They might raise taxes to provide better police protection or schools, or take stronger measures to provide a clean environment. Governments may do nothing to lower wages, but instead simply sell investors on their country by pointing to the low wage levels they already have.

    Jeffrey Winters studied the Indonesian government's efforts to attract investment to that country from 1965 to 1995 using a method like the one John Stuart Mill used in his book, Logic, which Mill called the method of concomitant variation.28 Indonesia is one of the countries where it is hard to tell what combination of government, military, wealthy elites and foreign advisors makes policy. Due to this, the so-called government of Indonesia could consciously 1) put Indonesia in competition with other countries to attract investors, 2) know that Indonesia was vulnerable to competition from other third world states with even lower wages, 3) use low wages as a selling point to attract foreign investors, 4) keep wages low by suppressing labor unions and not enforcing the guarantees of labor rights within Indonesia's Constitution, 5) have well-planned environmental and conservation objectives, which it often had to weigh against its need to attract investors and 6) levy taxes in favor of investors, though taxes were not a big factor as Indonesia did not collect much in taxes because oil royalties and foreign aid mainly funded its budgets.

    Winters has shown that Indonesian eagerness to attract investment went up or down, as concomitantly varied, according to the extent of capital mobility and how critically Indonesia needed money. Mobile capital, which was able to bring investments in quickly or take them out quickly, garnered the most favors. Investors whose assets were tied up in heavy, fixed capital equipment that was hard to move caught fewer favors. When oil revenues rose, Indonesia's need for foreign investment fell as its willingness to accept foreign investment through onerous terms decreased and ,thus, its negotiating stance stiffened. When oil revenues decreased so did barriers to foreign investment, while incentives designed to attract investors increased.

    The competition among governments to attract investments, as Winters studied it, is a quasi-natural process that displays certain constant conjunctions of phenomena. One might even speak figuratively of investment flows and of wage levels as if they were water flows and water levels. Thus, one might, in the literal sense, report that the former tends to go where the latter is low.

    In addition, one can study the race to the bottom as an effect caused by structures. One can think of it as a game played within the normative framework provided by certain basic moral and legal structures of the modern world-system. Perhaps the most basic of the structures, like those discussed above, validates capital flight because people, including artificial persons such as corporations, are (with limited exceptions) free to do with their money and other property what they wish to do, for whatever reason.

    Adding this rather banal structural observation, at once, implies two corollaries of great practical and theoretical importance. So, there is no reason to expect that everyone who wants a job will have one. People without independent incomes in business or professions can, normally, be expected to want a job, nevertheless no one is obligated to give them a job. If X decides to hire Y, X will. X, however, could have done otherwise. If X, for whatever reason, chooses to decline to hire Y, X will decline.

    Despite many volumes of economic theory to the contrary, there is no reason to expect full employment. There is no reason to think that lack of full employment needs to be explained by government interference with market forces or by any policy error or unusual circumstance. Someone choosing to hire someone sometimes happens and investors will invest to create enough jobs and produce enough goods to make the entire world prosperous. Investors invest when they please because the money is theirs to do with as they please.

    The two consequences of a basic structural norm (which correlates to Giddens' concept of structure set) suggest some additions to the analysis of the race to the bottom. It takes place in a world where it is expected that

  • workers will always outnumber jobs
  • the practice of a government providing incentives to attract investors will never bring about full employment at equitable wages worldwide and
  • the race will not lead to the utopia of an entire world that is developed. Human needs, therefore, will always outnumber needs met via the agency of investors who put up capital to produce goods and services in the expectation of making profits through sales.
  • How might the race to the bottom turn around to become a march to the top in which nations cooperate to achieve social and environmental objectives? The question clarifies the knowledge that thinking of structures as causes makes a practical as well as a theoretical difference. Much of the empirical research, such as that of Winters, however, contributes to understanding the problem. The additional insight provided by paying attention to structures is almost essential because structural change is needed to solve the problem.

    The growth imperative

    In his book General Theory, Keynes wrote:

    Keynes calls this a psychological fact, though the term structural fact is more accurate as psychology implies that the economy's need for growth (enough current investment to absorb the excess of current output over current consumption) could by abolished by psychotherapy. It makes it seem as though there would be no need for growth if some attitude-change moved people to spend every dollar they took in. Calling it the psychology of the community makes it sound as though there could be a different community with a different psychology, such that growth, would be unnecessary to make up for the shortfall in consumption. Actually, any community with a similar social structure has the same problem because it is unreasonable to expect people to spend every dollar they receive because people will either spend or save.

    Keynes' argument shows that the growth imperative is not just a matter of ill will. It is not just that greedy global corporations and people have unbridled appetites to keep reinvesting profits in order to accumulate profits endlessly. Nor is it just a matter of good will. It is not just that the private and public sectors both work to promote growth because their leaders love the poor and wish to enlarge the economic pie so that there will always be bigger slices for the poorest. Growth is a matter of keeping the system going, therefore, growth is an imperative built into the structure of the system. The alternative to growth is that, as Keynes points out that employers would make a loss, which means layoffs, bankruptcies and a downward spiral. A structural growth imperative exists to command growth regardless of whether it comes from good or bad intentions and regardless of whether the consequences are good or bad.

    Making a virtue of a necessity, now the path of steady economic growth, is often equated with the path to success. The concept of growth solves Keynes' problem because it plows back much money into the economy as investments every year so that, overall, no lack of aggregate demand persists. Merchants can sell their products and, thus, they can pay their employees.

    Furthermore, vital growing industries can sometimes—as in the heyday of the growth of the social democratic economies of Western Europe in the 1960s—bring in profits large enough to make it possible to pay high wages. Productivity growth can be translated into increases in employee compensation. Moreover, growth expands the tax base, which enables the government to expand public services.

    Solving society's principal problems through unlimited and continuous economic growth extending into the indefinite future sounds too good to be true and it is. Making growth compatible with ecological concerns requires restricting it to green growth, which is not easy to do. Maintaining islands of high wages in a world sea of low wages requires maintaining growth year after year, which entails the endless development of new products. It involves the battle to 1) keep technological leads and 2) entice investors to keep investing, which in tandem with raising wages, is even harder. Thus, in practice, it is impossible to keep ahead in technology while:

  • keeping investment flowing enough to match aggregate demand with aggregate supply
  • sopping up unemployment with new jobs
  • keeping economic growth fast enough to reduce poverty and
  • subject to the constraint, only green growth is true growth.
  • The growth imperative has the effect of putting even the rich parts of the world, those nations that have succeeded in growing economically, on a treadmill where they must run faster and faster just to stay in place. No amount of consumption, new product invention and new marketing strategies is enough. No amount of sacrifice of other values to do whatever it takes to keep growth going is enough and, thus, as Keynes wrote:

    These lines from Keynes, however, are misleading insofar as they promise light at the end of the tunnel because, by Keynes' own reasoning, there is no reason to expect the growth imperative to ever stop, as long as the structures, which give rise to it, are in place. Every caring and aware human being must ask the questions: How did we get on this growth treadmill? How can we get off it? Research that examines the basic systemic structure of the modern world offers much toward answering these questions.

    The Holocaust

    I use the holocaust to sort, at least in part, what might appear ambiguous in Patomaki's argument. On the other hand, he finds support for his views in the empirical evidence supplied by the Deutsch careful historical case studies. They support the conclusion that peace can be established by creating reliable and effective institutions for achieving peaceful change in the directions most people want, which is more rights and liberties, equality and prosperity. However, Patomaki finds much to criticize in the methodologies that use the statistical analysis of datasets to confirm theories (most notably Kant's), which lead the authors to predict that peace will prevail throughout a region when all the states there are democratic.31 Patomati might appear to be agreeing with Deutsch, not with Singer, when using the similar Deutsch methods to arrive at similar conclusions. A short discussion about how one might understand the holocaust may clarify this ambiguity. It may provide another example of why attention to basic structures has both methodological and practical importance.

    My uncle Jack, a second lieutenant in the United States Army, was among the many who gave their lives to prevent tragedies like the holocaust from recurring. Tragedies like the holocaust have, nevertheless, happened again in Argentina, Biafra, Cambodia, Chile, Indonesia, Rwanda and elsewhere. Through peace research, many scholars have furthered the cause that Uncle Jack accepted by volunteering to fight Hitler. They have learned how to prevent holocaust-like tragedies by understanding the causes.

    A Humean scholar seeking to discover the causes of events like the holocaust is faced with the initial difficulty of deciding what to classify as a holocaust. Using a Humean methodology, one would have to identify a class of phenomena as holocausts and then seek to determine what other classes of phenomena are always conjoined with it or frequently conjoined with it at a high level of statistical significance. What a scholar chooses to regard as a tragedy like the holocaust would reveal the scholar's ethical orientation and make known the sorts of policy recommendations likely to emerge from the research. If the choice is to focus on anti-Semitism, then the class of similar phenomena to be studied will include the pogroms in Russia, Poland and other places. If the choice is to focus on the systematic killing of the members of an ethnic group, then other holocaust-like events will be defined as genocide. If the choice is to focus on the systematic killing of any group of people who are considered unworthy of life and deserving of death by other people who have the power as well as the will to destroy them, then Indonesia in 1965 and all of the aforementioned states where tragedies would count, too. Different datasets will be defined if the choice is to focus on 1) rage that is out of control, 2) the intelligent and systematic implementation of cruelty, or 3) the ideological construction of the other as evil.

    On the other hand, it is viable to take the view that there was only the one holocaust in Germany and in German-occupied areas in the early 1940s. Its victims were Jews, Communists, Socialists, labor leaders, gypsies, homosexuals and some others condemned to die for various reasons. In this last view, one might give up trying to understand the holocaust with the methods of social science understood as methods that measure the impacts of variables on variables. The holocaust-like event would not be a variable because there was no more than one. Thus, there would be no class of such events to count, rank, or scale in order to give a variable a numerical value. One might then revert to trying to understand the holocaust with the methods of history, conceived as methods for studying unique events.

    Unless the holocaust is studied as a unique phenomenon, defining the class of holocaust-like phenomena excludes information. Any member of the class of such tragedies will have characteristics additional to and different from other tragedies lumped together with it in the same class. Furthermore, no reason exists to suppose that the boundaries marked by assigning a name to a class of events correspond to any fault lines along which causal powers move. Assigning a name to a class of phenomena and, thus, defining a variable operationally is no guarantee that one has grasped forces at work in reality. As Knorr Cetina reminds us—A stable name is not an expression and indicator of stable thing.32

    Whatever does not count as defining the class to be studied operationally will not be regarded at all, insofar as the class, though not its individual members, then becomes the object of study. The class, so defined as an object of study, may and may not have some real relationship to causal powers.

    Such considerations lead to a reason Patomaki can repose more confidence in the Deutsch studies than in those conceived in Singer's tradition of the Correlates of War project. Patomaki emphasizes that classes are never causes. To calculate the impact of X on Y where X and Y are variables (classes) is never to give a causal explanation. Causes must be sought among things, not among the names of the classes used to put things in categories. Furthermore, the very process that puts a number of historical phenomena into the same category in order to define a variable is a process that loses information about things. Deutsch loses comparatively little information in their extensive case studies of particular transitions from armed mutual suspicion to the peaceful security community. They achieve this by way of their: 1) complex and qualified conclusions, 2) methodological caution and 3) use of elementary mathematics. They are less prone to covertly treat classes as causes, or to treat measurements of quantitative relationships among classes as tests of causal hypotheses.

    Patomaki does go further than Deutsch by proposing a critical realist methodology for peace studies. Patomaki recommends an approach that is explicitly non-Humean. On the other hand, Patomaki's critical realist approach is not restricted by the doctrine that because world political events are unique no causes producing them can be identified.

    However, this does not mean that in place of 1) the positivist notion that once the values of the independent variables are known, then the value of the dependent variable can be predicted and 2) that in place of the notion found in some versions of Marxism that the laws of the of capital accumulation decree only one inevitable result, nor that 3) a realist notion now exists authorizing social scientists to predict the future. No, meanings are causes because they explain human action. A characteristic of human action, however, is that the actor could have done otherwise. Critical realism and idealism merge in the human actors who are able to transform the meaningful contexts of their actions. It is realistic to say that the ecological niche of the human species is the cultural animal and that cultural animals create social structures. About this, Roy Bhaskar writes that:

    It may well be the case, as the neo-realists maintain, that up to now it has been hard to change the rules and principles of global order, except by military means. Nothing in the nature of things, however, makes this necessarily the case. Peaceful change is, in principle, a change that is feasible, doable.

    For critical realism, the route to preventing the recurrence of holocaust-like events is more than one of gauging causal factors that are linked to violence. It is more the course of learning how to bring forth positive structural change that facilitates creating cultures of peace where ethnic hostility is in remission. In Patomaki's somewhat esoteric terminology, the question is about the self-transforming capacities of contexts. It is less about the crimes of Hitler and more about how to move beyond the fallible and ineffectual Weimar Republic. It is less about the immediate conditions that triggered the outbreak of WW II and more about the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to establish a viable international peace after WW I. It is less about the crimes of Suharto and more about the weakness of the fledgling social democracy proclaimed in Indonesia when the Dutch departed in 1955.

    Such is the thrust of Patomaki's last chapter, "Beyond Nordic Nostalgia." The chapter discusses the attempt to and likelihood of reversing the decline of Scandinavian social democracy. Apart from the fact that it is natural for Patomaki, a Finn, to be concerned about his own part of the world, the concerns of the last chapter are a logical outcome of the argument of the book. The entire world needs the models of reliable and effective peaceful change, which are the kind that the Scandinavian social democracy once provided.

    Transforming rules, relationships and practices

    The word structure occurs frequently in talk about issues such as those discussed above and, more generally, whenever it is a matter of unacceptable dilemmas such as severe unemployment or environmental destruction, intractable social and economic contradictions, or persistent poverty or whenever it is a matter of imagining a juggernaut unstoppable by human wills. The structure is said to override human desire and ethics and to alone produce irreversible changes in society with names such as globalization, commodification and alienation. The structure stymies peaceful change. Better conceptual tools for thinking about structure would make peace and justice easier to achieve. Some part of the problems alleged to be structural problems might more easily resolve with the aid of better ways of thinking about social structure.

    Jean Piaget and Anthony Giddens are among those who have published extensive discussions of the use of the term structure in science, particularly in social science during the 19th and 20th centuries. I refer the reader to them, instead of summarizing them.35 Giddens reviews how the term has been used by the French writers known as structuralists and as post-structuralists and by sociologists in the United States who are known as structural-functionalists. I will limit my comments to how Patomaki defines the term in 2001. Patomaki's definition is the outcome of a constructive critique of the definitions of structure as provided by Giddens and Bhaskar. The critiques are outcomes of the constructive critique of two centuries of thought concerning the best way to consider structure.

    One standard use of the term can be disregarded at the outset. Structural problems are sometimes assumed to be about social inequality, which can be defined by classifying people into groups in ways relying on a definition of structure as composition. Social scientists speak of, for example, the age structure of a human population and the age composition, for example, how many people are under five years old, over ninety years old and how many are in each age class as defined. Similarly, one can speak of an income structure by saying that the top ten percent take fifty percent of the income, while the bottom fifty percent get a mere ten percent of the income. Alternatively, one can speak of a world wealth structure such that the richest one percent own more than the next sixty percent own. Nonetheless, classes are not causes and, thus, it is more important to know why, though knowing how much inequality exists helps as well. For the present purposes, it is better to reserve the designation structural problems for use in discovering the causes that produce inequality and the traps that frustrate efforts to reduce inequality.

    Structure defined as composition or as classification can, therefore, be disregarded for present purposes. Such compositional structures are, as Patomaki writes,

    ... secondary in terms of the causal and, thus, ontological in relation to the much richer conceptual relational structures.36

    Patomaki begins a discussion of structure by considering the conclusions of Anthony Giddens' extensive work on the concept, which features the ideas of rules and resources. Giddens' careful and complex views suggest that to learn what comprises the structure of a society one asks a) What are the rules? and b) Who controls the resources?

    The idea of social structures as rules is plausible because the structural problems discussed above are about property rights, in one way or another. Property rights are legal rules. Ludwig Wittgenstein examines rules in his Philosophical Investigations showing rules to be a theme worth tracing to shed light on aspects of social life often placed under such headings as norms, roles, games, discourse, practice, habitus, meaning and custom.37 Wittgenstein's work reassures those who share Michel Foucault's concern that to give rules a central role in social analysis would be to succumb to the naive illusion that a ruler who makes the rules, thus, governs society. Furthermore, within a post-Wittgenstein (and post-Heideger) explanation of rules, to choose to say that institutional structures are made of rules is not to deny that they are made of practices. On the contrary, it affirms that structures are made of practices.

    Placing rules as a central theme of social science has the advantage of building a "land bridge" between social science and jurisprudence. It keeps jurisprudence from detaching as a separate intellectual continent. It facilitates dialogue toward world peace through world law by framing it in the common vocabulary of dialogue about rules. Giddens notes that an image the that the word structure evokes is that of the girders of a building. Thus, the "girders" of a society are its guiding principles, which are the rules.

    Giddens stops short of defining social structure entirely as a matter of rules because he finds that the idea of rules does not lend itself to an adequate explanation of the role that power has in structuring human relationships. He adds resources to his definition because he believes that to understand a social structure one must know, both 1) what the rules are and 2) who has power to command resources. The trouble with this addition is that it might be perceived as redundant because the rules of society determines who has power to command resources. On the other hand, making allowance for power as a concept independent of rules seems, in the intuitive sense, plausible, in part, because it seems that "naked power" overrides the rules, at times. Mainstream political science, in general, favors making power, rather than rules, the central organizing theme for research.

    Giddens' concession to the thesis that power trumps rules may seem correct from the viewpoint of mainstream political science. Though it may seem correct and no doubt is partly correct, I will argue that it is less correct than it may seem. Political scientists often distinguish authority and/or legitimacy from the concept of power. Social rules (norms), they say, prescribe who is supposed to rule and make the laws, though in a showdown (simplifying the theory) of military force, economic force, or both might overpower the legitimate government. After the holders of real power seize control of the government in disregard of the norms of the rule of law, they can then make up rules to suit their ends. They can expound an ideology to provide legitimacy for their rules and then compel the children in all schools to study it as Suharto did with the pancasila ideology in Indonesia, as Stalin did with dialectical materialism in Russia and as Salazar did with a corporatist version of the Roman Catholic social doctrine in Portugal.

    The thesis that power trumps rules withstands scrutiny better in the case of military power than in the case of economic power. Even in the case of military power, the thesis has its limitations as the studies by Hannah Arendt 38 and Gene Sharp 39 show that even military power depends upon consent and consensus. The over-generalized notion that people who have military power can afford to ignore social rules is shown also, by examples in which the possessors of moral legitimacy—through the use of nonviolence—defeated the possessors of military hardware. This occurred several times in the history of the 20th century.

    Economic power, however, is the key player of the modern world-system. In the case of economic power, the thesis that power overrides the rules appears in a different light when it is recognized that the economic power of property owners consists wholly of rights created and maintained by legal rules. Although, with certainty, the rule of law in a modern state implies that the police may use force, this does not mean that the rules have no customary, conventional and moral force. It means, instead, that the physical power of the sovereign democratic state is committed to supporting the rules through law-enforcement. The dependence of economic power upon the legal rules that define property rights is clear in Legal Foundations of Capitalism, by John R. Commons (1924) in which he wrote:

      Economic power is simply power to withhold from others what they need. In short, the change in the concept of property from physical things to the exchange-value of things is a change from the concept of holding things for their own use to withholding things from others' use, protected, in either case by the physical power of the sovereign.

      The transition from the notion of holding things for one's own use and enjoyment to the notion of economic power over others evidently accompanies the historical evolution of property from slavery, feudalism, colonialism and a sparse population, to marketing, business and the pressure of population on limited resources. Where production was isolated, or the owner held under his control all of the material things as well as the laborers necessary to the support of himself and dependents, the concept of exclusive holding for self was a workable definition of property. When, however, markets expanded, laborers were emancipated, people began to live by bargain and sale, population increased and all resources became private property—then the power to withhold from others emerged gradually from that of exclusive holding for self as an economic attribute of property. The one is implied in the other, though it does not unfold until new conditions bring it to the fore. Just as the scales of the reptile become the feathers of the bird when the environment moves from land to air, so to does the exclusive holding for ones self becomes withholding from others when the environment moves from production to marketing.

      The transition was noticeable as long as the merchant, the master and the laborer were combined under small units of ownership. It becomes distinct, however, when all opportunities are occupied and business is conducted by corporations on a credit system that consolidates property under the control of absentee owners. Then, the power of property per se, as distinguished from the power residing in personal faculties or special grants of sovereignty, comes into prominence. It becomes a power to extract things in exchange from other persons in the absence of and wholly separate from individual human faculties a power of property per se, silently operating, though seen and distinguishable from the manual, mental and managerial abilities of its owners.

      This power of property, in itself, is the power to withhold. As seen in these extreme cases, it is a mere enlargement of that power existing in all property as the source of value in exchange and perhaps distinguished as waiting-power [staying-power] as the power to hold back until the opposite party consents to the bargain. While as investors, they perform the indispensable service of waiting for compensation, as bargainers they determine, through their power to wait, what shall be the terms of that which compensation shall be made.

      This enlargement of property from economy to economic power also separates, or at least distinguishes, management from ownership. For the activity of management is mainly that of proportioning the factors so to get the largest net result from all. However, the function of ownership is that of determining the conditions as terms, prices, or values at which the factors shall be obtained from others or the product sold to others.40

    Commons' analysis shows that the command over resources—as economic power—is inseparable from legal rules and the privileges conferred by legal rules. Thus, in this important respect, rules constitute power. Although it is, no doubt, for the most part true that—those who have the gold make the rules, it is also largely true that the rules determine who has the gold. Therefore, to the extent that structural problems, such as capital flight and others discussed above, are problems about economic power, they are also problems about rules. They are the rules that define what property owners can do to exclude others from their property in

  • bargaining
  • moving their property from place to place
  • using or not using their property and as Commons' emphasizes,
  • withholding permission for others to use their property until their terms are met.
  • For a reason that differs from mine, Patomaki thinks that Giddens, in his explanation of social science, does not fully understand the complex interplay between rules and power. Patomaki sees that Giddens' explanation of structure does not adequately incorporate Foucault's widening of the concept of power to include productive power. About this, Patomaki writes that:
      Productive power is the idea that power also produces elements of the social world, discursive knowledge, techniques, practical knowledge and skills that constitute internal social relations. Many of the consequent effects may be unintended.41
    Patomaki's critique of Giddens, by way of Foucault, blends into a broader critique, which draws on the idea that power constitutes social relationships. Patomaki frames his critique, initially, in terms of compositions (classes) and relations. About this, he writes that:
      Giddens's definition of structure as rules and resources does not sound plausible because the term that is structure is normally used in connection with compositions and/or relations.42

    Disregarding compositions (classifications such as the income structure of the population) for the reason given above, the proper use of the word that is structure, thus, comes to depend, for Patomaki, upon relations. This brings us back to Karl Marx who does not write about structure, though he does write everywhere about social relationships (G verhaltnisse). Marx' constant theme is that political economy is a pseudo-science as a quack imitation of engineering that charades as natural, though which is, in fact, historically contingent upon social relationships. The most important of the relations is that between the owner of the means of production and the worker who has nothing to sell but labor power.

    Giddens, however, does not neglect relations in his explanation of structure. In particular, he does not neglect the relations that were central to Marx' critique of political economy. Instead, he interprets them within a framework of rules and resources. Giddens begins a long discussion of structures by defining them as rule-resource sets that are involved in the institutional articulation of social systems. He does this by considering the role of private property relationships in Marx' analysis of modern capitalism. To this point, Giddens writes that:

      Consider what is involved in the following structural set of private property, money, capital, labor contract and profit. The structural relations indicated here mark out one of the most fundamental transmutations involved in the emergence of capitalism and, hence, contribute in a significant way to the overall structuration of the system.43

    Therefore, Giddens' explanation of the rules and resources of social structure makes specific use of the relations that Marx analyzed, though using a terminology different than Marx' and slightly different than Patomaki's. Thus, Patomaki concludes with a relational definition of social structure, which owes much to Foucault's idea of a positioned practice in which productive power defines the positions occupied by the actors. It follows that:

      Definition 6: The term that is social structure refers to internal and external relations of positioned practice. These relations are implicated and/or generated by the components of the relevant causal complex.44

    Rules are not exempt from the Patomaki definition. In each of the next three sentences of his text, he explains what internal and external relations are as he writes about rules and/or constitutive rules. Like Giddens, Patomaki employs the idea of rules in explicating the meaning of relations.

    It is easy to "lose sight of the forest while looking at the trees." The broad intellectual "canopy" provided by rules may and may not be broad enough to "house" everything that needs saying to "flesh out" the concept of social structure. It may and may not be broad enough to house what needs saying about power, economic power, productive power relations, control of resources, practices and positions.

    What does remain clear, nevertheless, to vary the metaphors, when the "dust settles and the fog lifts," is that we are "no longer in Kansas," if Kansas is the "flat Humean prairie" of conjunctions among phenomena, where science is about finding out the degree of probability with which the value of an independent variable predicts the value of a dependent variable. We are, instead, living on the blue planet third from the Sun, upon which humans create social structures. Institutions have been constructed and they can be deconstructed and reconstructed. The forms can be transformed. Given these structural obstacles to the institutionalization of peaceful change, capital flight, the race to the bottom, the growth imperative and the ineffectiveness of social democracy leading to exacerbated ethnic conflict, it becomes easier to see, once one leaves Kansas, that there is nothing inevitable about them. Whatever else the Giddens and Patomaki analyses of social structure may imply, they do imply that structural obstacles are moveable. Therefore, let us move some.

    In Patomaki's terminology, let us advance the emancipatory project of enhancing the self-transforming capacities of contexts. To this end, I will draw some practical suggestions for peace building from the post-Wittgenstein discussion of rules in H. L. A. Hart's, The Concept of Law. Hart defines law as the union of primary rules with secondary rules.45 The secondary rules prescribe the primary rules that become laws.For example, it may be a secondary rule that a constitution approved by plebiscite is law [primary rule]. It may be a secondary rule that whatever a duly elected parliament enacts is law (primary) or that whatever a Supreme Court decides is the meaning of an ambiguous statute as a law [primary].

    Hart's definition of law has implications of what it would take to achieve world peace through global law, some of which he described in a chapter devoted to international law. Hart's definition sheds light on the principle for peace as stated by J. L. Brierly in The Law of Nations, about which Brierly wrote:

      The existence of a police force does not make a system of law strong and respected. Instead, the strength of the law makes it possible for a police force to be effectively organized.46

    The idea of secondary rules as a framework for identifying and changing primary rules also clarifies Patomaki's point that peace should not be conceived as the achievement of any kind of final order. Instead, it forms the institution of a reliable processes for achieving constructive social change. The institution of the peaceful processes for change consists, largely, of accepting secondary rules that determine the putative primary rules as rules that are legitimate and valid rules. The secondary rules define what counts as a legitimate change in the primary rules.

    Hart's explanation of rules in general, which are primary rules, sheds even more light on peacemaking. He finds that rules have three aspects 1) regularity, 2) criticism and 3) an internal aspect.

    1. Regularity. A rule is, first, an observable regularity in people's conduct: a pattern. A complex interplay occurs between the regularities prescribed by cultural norms and the regularities as observed in practice. Nonetheless, there are regularities. It follows that if structures are rules (at least to some considerable extent), then structures will change by changing the regularities in people's conduct. Gandhi took such a view about change when he strove to change his own conduct, as a first step toward changing society. Although Gandhi never used the word structure, he stood for the proposition that structural change begins when one voluntarily [deliberately] follows different rules in daily practice. For example, Gandhi wrote:

      Now let us consider how equal distribution can be brought about through nonviolence. The first step towards it is for him who has made this ideal part of his being to bring about the necessary changes in his personal life. He would reduce his wants to a minimum, bearing in mind the poverty of India. His earnings would be free of dishonesty. The desire for speculation would be renounced. His habitation would be in keeping with his new mode of life. Self-restraint would be exercised in every sphere of life. When he has done all that is possible for his life, only then will he be in the position as an example to preach this ideal among his associates and neighbors.47

    The present analysis clarifies that individuals and groups change the regular patterns of their behavior. When they do, they are not simply working outside the system, leaving the existing social structures intact, because structures are largely, at least, regular patterns of behavior. To change the rules that people live by is to change structure.

    2. Criticism. A rule is, in Hart's analysis, an ideal of proper or correct conduct and violating it authorizes other people to criticize the violator. Punishment may result, although social disapproval may be enough. If violation never has a consequence, then the rule does not exist. A past rule that is now a relic may, through habit, still garner status as a rule, nevertheless it is now a former rule no longer followed. Because structures are (at least to a considerable extent) patterns of behavior for which violation leads to disapproval, it follows that the weight of a community's value judgments is a constituent part of social structure. Changing the moral and ultimate legal, judgments of the citizens of a society is an essential part of changing social structure. If, for example, the weight of public opinion is that war is not a proper instrument of national policy, what Betty Reardon calls the war system 48 to some extent, ceases to exist.

    Normative criticism is an active ingredient of rules, which are that from which structures are made. The Deutsch study gives practical examples of this point by showing that the antiwar sentiment of the people in Sweden facilitated a peaceful outcome when Norway seceded from Sweden. Similarly, citizens in United States played a vital role preventing the United States from invading Mexico when its nationalized United States corporate petroleum interests. In general, taking a stand for conscience, when done by shifting society's values constructively, is more than just wishing the social structure would change—it is the act of changing it.

    3. Internal aspect: Obeying rules is internal to the minds of the people who follow them: they take guidance from rules. The race to the bottom, for example, attracts investors who take guidance from the rules of accounting. The corporate managers who make investment decisions follow the rules of sound management. They deliberately cut costs and choose to accept offers to invest in nations that offer favorable terms. They do not intend to produce a world of poverty and violence. They do intend to comply with their fiduciary duties as the managers of the funds that others have entrusted to them. Their deliberate acts, along with other causes, contribute to the race to the bottom even though they do not intend its consequences.

    When the causal links between the obeying of rules and the, at times, unknown and/or unintended consequences of obeying rules become better known, it will be easier to design institutions that work. Correctly following the socially approved rules should lead to socially desired results, though often it does not. Emancipatory research is then needed to increase the self-transforming capacity of context. It is needed to mesh the inward and subjective aspects of obeying rules with the objective consequences of obeying the rules.

    Evaluating the objective consequences using emancipation as the standard gives privileges to freedom as a value. Patomaki's sympathies are generally with those who name the desired outcome of social change as emancipation. Thus, he follows the lead of Jurgen Habermas who, in his book, Knowledge and Human Interests,16 defined emancipatory science as a science whose governing interest is to produce knowledge that liberates. Patomaki, however, broadens the scope of the dialogue about goals by pointing out that freedom is not the only value; about this, he wrote:

      Social practices and systems can be evaluated from a number of normative standpoints, including economic efficiency and stability, as well as rights, justice, democracy, human flourishing and ecological well-being.49

    To Patomaki's open list, I add stewardship, Gandhi's word for trusteeship, a virtue that promises to transform economic power and, thus, overcome structural obstacles to peaceful change. As Gandhi points out, the need for trusteeship does not disappear with democratic or public control of resources. Public sector managers, as well as private sector and nonprofit sector managers, are called by stewardship to use property for the good of others. They too are tempted by self-interest to exercise economic power to withhold the use of property until a bargain is struck maximally favorable to them.

    I will extend my discussion of Hart's internal aspect of rules in order to make the point that peace building requires attention to both the subjective and the objective sides of structural transformation. The internal aspect of rules represents the subjective side.

    In his book, The Concept of Law, (1961) Hart's insistence that rules have an internal aspect drove a wedge into the armor of positivism.45 The person who obeys the rule does so deliberately in the privacy of her or his mind. Observers cannot see the internal aspect, which is contrary to 1) behaviorism, 2) behaviorist interpretations of Wittgenstein, 3) Hume's doctrine that science is about finding constant or probable conjunctions among the sense impressions of observers and 4) certain versions of the structuralism of the French school, post-structuralism and Marxism.

    Positivists were known to deny what they called introspection as a legitimate method of science. Science, for them, had to be based upon what could be observed and, thus, the unobservable might as well not exist. In contrast, Hart's internal aspect of rules reflect the reversal of the post-Wittgenstein theories of human action, thus restored back to the Aristotelian principle that people act according to their characters and based on their beliefs, which may or may not coincide with the objective facts.

    Today the genie is out of the bottle. Although statistical methods are still entrenched in the practice of social science, nobody now defends them by appealing to the empiricist and positivists basis. "Positivism is a swear word that nobody swears by," as Bhaskar remarked. It is generally conceded that rules and, therefore, social structures consist, in part, of the subjective beliefs and attitudes of people. A rule exists, in part, because people subjectively look to it for guidance; thus, Aristotle is right. If structuralism means that people do not continually renegotiate, choose and reconstruct the patterns of social life, then structuralism is wrong. Something like the theories of structuration offered by Giddens, Patomaki, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau or Jacques Derrida is right, or closer to right.

    Although mistaken, it is tempting to conclude that the rules governing society are 1) only the rules of daily life writ large and 2) just the subjective maxims [rules] of actions, what Kant identified as the principles by which individuals choose to guide their conduct. If these tempting conclusions were true, then peace could be established by spiritual conversion. The following example shows why such a subjective approach to peace is incomplete.

    Suppose that a group of people change the rule they follow in daily life from the bookkeeping rule of—buy cheap and sell dear, which defines Homo economicus, to the rule of love they neighbor as thyself, as prescribed by religions. The internal aspect of the new rule is that each person in the group takes it as a guide. The group follows the new rule's guidance (or believing they are following it, which amounts to the same thing as long as it is the subjective side that is under consideration). The group members withdraw money from their savings accounts and use the money to buy food and shipment of the food given to hungry people in a third world country. A consequence of the free food for the third world country is that the local farmers cannot sell their products. The farmers must quit farming and migrate to the cities joining other ex-farmers who were forced to migrate to the city for a different reason, which is that capital-intensive corporate agriculture displaced them. They join the homeless begging on the city streets. The subjective rule adopted by the donors of food, thus, proved to have disastrous objective consequences. The food donors encountered a structural problem and just when we thought we had learned to solve structural problems by changing the internal aspects of rules and, therefore, the rules that constitute the structures.

    The general point is the same as the one made by the previous example of the corporate managers who participate in the race to the bottom. They do intend to follow the rules of Homo economicus, the rules prescribed by generally accepted accounting principles. They intend to manage their businesses properly. They aim to be faithful to the fiduciary duties that they owe to their shareholders. Poverty and violence are the objective consequences and not the subjective intentions of the maxims from which they look for guidance.

    The general point is that changing the internal aspect of rules is necessary, although not sufficient to change social structures. The internal aspect of rules is not going away nor will it disappear as a Paretian derivative that can be disregarded by social science because it has no causal powers.50 People who follow rules, however, often do not know the causal powers of their compliance. Social scientists often do not know them either and Patomaki argues that it is their job to discover them. They can recognize them, as Patomaki claims, by using a critical realist methodology that seeks to link causes and effects, where rules are an essential part of the causes. The subjective rules people follow, the internal aspect of rules, is part, though only part, of the causal complex that leads to the consequences.51

    Overemphasis on either the causal efficacy of the subjective side leads to the illusion that structures will transform by spiritual conversion, or the objective side lead to the illusions that structures will transform by public policy, without spiritual conversion, or no structural transformation is needed. The objective illusion is the Keynesian illusion, after Keynes who proposed to leave the subjective values of the masses of the people alone. Keynes proposed to correct the instability and, to some extent, the injustice of capitalism by way of his macroeconomic policies as guided by the new science of macroeconomics, of which he was one of the founders. Ordinary people would go on buying and selling as usual and business people would make their business plans as usual.

    The policy instruments of the nation state, however, managed the context in which they made their calculations expectantly by those instruments to be wielded by the international economic institutions, which Keynes envisaged. Government policy instruments would manage the system to make it work better, without requiring any improvement in the manners and morals of the general population. The instruments are taxes, interest rates, public spending, price supports, price controls (as needed), public deficits as surpluses calculated to offset the business cycle, foreign money exchange controls, bank reserve requirements, government backing for collective bargaining and other means for adjusting the money supply.

    Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal was another of the founders of macroeconomics. He was an architect of its successful application in the formation of public policy in post WW II Sweden. Myrdal believed, however, in the importance of the subjective side of social transformation. He believed that the success of social democracy depends mainly on the deliberate practices of the mass of the people working to mobilize resources to meet needs in cities, cooperatives, at every NGO level and, thus, less on central government policy. Myrdal wanted social planning to be the framework for realizing the Jeffersonian ideal of grassroots democracy. He wanted a welfare culture characterized by solidarity, participation and identification with the community. About this, Myrdal wrote:

      The reason it is important to stress the deeper changes of people's attitudes—as a causal factor underlying the trend toward intervention and planning in the Western world—is that these psychological changes, related to the whole development of our modern society, make the process non-reversible.52

    Ultimately, the macro-managing of the modern welfare state proved to have severe limitations. The gains of social democracy have proven more reversible than Myrdal thought they were. Social democracy in Sweden and elsewhere encountered structural problems.53 Experience has shown that although macroeconomics may be a partial solution to structural problems, it is not the whole solution. Although Myrdal was mistaken to the extent that he thought that the forward progress of social democracy was nonreversible, the principle he enunciated might, nevertheless, be right. If there had been more emphasis upon the deeper changes of people's attitudes, then perhaps the progress of social democracy would have been permanent. It would have been lasting in the sense that its enhanced capacity for continual self-transformation would have been preserved.

    Social democracies have declined, as did the influence of Keynesian economic theory, roughly the theory that led the post WW II West European social democracies. The decline suggests that something is wrong with the general concept of improving society without improving people. I do not mean to oppose this suggestion in favor of the explanations of the decline of social democracy that focus on the crises due to unstable regimes of accumulation. Neither do I mean replace it with the explanations of the decline of social democracy that focus on the global liberalization of trade, production and finance, which enhanced the exit options of capital. Instead, I propose to integrate this suggestion with them; a theory of social structure in which structures are rules, relationships and practices suggests that if structures are to be transformed, it will require something more multifaceted than any combination of policy instruments wielded by well-informed civil servants. Therefore, if, as asserted that: 1) structures are made partly by rules and 2) rules have an internal aspect, then it follows that structures will not change without a change in the beliefs and conscious behavior of the people who follow the rules.

    Patomaki advocates research that is emancipatory in the sense that it increases freedom. Learning how systems and structures work is liberating because it facilitates the transformation of both so that they work better. The future is undetermined and, thus, enhanced by inspired human action. Emancipatory research can uplift human action and potential.

    Peace research of the kind that Patomaki advocates contributes to a future in which doing what is subjectively considered right produces what is objectively good. It brings us closer to a future in which people who conscientiously follow the rules, which are regarded, as correct and proper in their social milieu, do not fall into structural traps that produce results they do not imagine or intend. Although emancipatory research does not prevent the oppression of the weak by the strong, it is likely to empower the weak and monitor the strong by making oppression visible. Although it does not prevent antisocial motives from overwhelming pro-social motives, it is likely to encourage moral education designed to strengthen pro-social motives. This is true because it shows that social structures are, in part, constituted by deliberate [voluntary] human action.

    Summary

    A logical plan for peace, which is implicit in After International Relations, starts with work in the social sciences that is devoted to freedom and other values. Patomaki advocates research guided by a critical realist methodology and philosophy. Critical realism attributes the success of the natural sciences to their ability to grasp the causal powers of the real structures, which produce the phenomena that scientific theories explain. Realistic social science does seek social causal explanations and, for that reason, it sees the future as open to improvement through deliberate choices. Emancipatory research as performed with the methods of critical realism improves self-transforming capacities, both within societies and between societies. It makes peaceful change easier to institutionalize. I have simplified Patomaki's multifaceted explanation by suggesting that peace-enhancing structural transformation must proceed both on the subjective side and on the objective side. Reliable expectations that needed changes can be achieved nonviolently lead to peace.

    After International Relations considers many topics that I do not mention and a number of points concerning structural problems and transformation, which are in the spirit of the book, though are not in the book and which its author may not agree with. These points summarize as follows. Because democracy facilitates peace, the success of democracy makes peace more likely. A successful democracy is a social democracy because it delivers the goods. To deliver them, it is necessary to cope with structural obstacles and ultimately to transform structures because they are made of rules, etc., structures do, with effort, transform rules and create change because behavior changes.

    Resources

    1. In Part XI, the word love appears only three times subsequent to it presence in the words taken from a homily by the martyred Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero, so, it might appear as an irrelevant introduction. Therefore, instead of explaining its relevance to the central themes of Part XI, I propose the discernment of its relevance as an exercise for the reader. A group discussion about Part XI might begin with the question—What does the rest of Part XI have to do with the introductory quotation?

    2. Heikki Patomaki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics. London: Routledge, 2001

    3. Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim and Richard Van Wagenen, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957

    4. Ibid.

    5. Quincy Wright, A Study of War. The analysis of this study suggests that the prevention of war involves simultaneous, general, and concerted attacks on educational, social, political and legal fronts. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) Ibid. at p. 1310

    6. Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, New York: Free Press, 1966)

    7. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, p. 135-36

    8. P. E. Corbett, The Individual and World Society. Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University, no. 2, 1953, p. 59, cited by Deutsch and collaborators on p. 164

    9. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict 1989-1999", in the Journal of Peace Research September 2000, p. 635-649. The authors count 110 armed conflicts during the period, defined as having at least 25 battle deaths. Counting each of these as a war, although the authors limit the term war to conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths, the breakdown is 94 civil wars, nine civil wars with foreign intervention and seven interstate wars.

    10. Thus, Max Weber wrote:

      What we must vigorously oppose is the view that one may be scientifically contented with the conventional self-evidence of very widely accepted value judgments. The specific function of science, it seems to me, is just the opposite: namely, to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident.

    The Methodology of the Social Sciences a collection of his writings edited by Edward Shils and Henry Finch, New York: Free Press, 1949, p. 13

    11. Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, a Critical Interpretation of Contemporary Philosophy, London: Verso Books, 1989

    12. Jeffrey Sachs and Felipe Larrain, Macroeconomics in the Global Economy, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993, p. xvii.

    13. Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001, p. 122

    14. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961. Max Weber, cited above, is also one of the sources of the verstehen/ erklaren distinction.

    15. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957

    16. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston, Beacon Press, 1971. Habermas starts with a version of the erklaren/verstehen distinction, conflating technical instrumental knowledge with erklaren and practical social understanding with verstehen. He transcends this dichotomy by proposing a third kind of knowledge, emancipatory or liberating knowledge.

    17. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970. Ricoeur wrote:

    ...a disjunction: either an explanation [erklaren] in terms of energy, or an understanding [verstehen] in terms of phenomenology. However, it must be recognized that Freudianism exists only because of its refusal of that disjunction. p. 66.

    18. Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, Stanford University Press, 1993, 2nd edition. Giddens brings sociology into dialogue with post-Wittgenstein philosophies of human action. The result is a social science of which the label neo-Aristotelian in the respect that deliberate human action plays key roles in explanation; meanings are causes.

    19. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Marcuse criticizes behaviorism and empiricism generally. The transformation of society requires the work of the negative, which denies what is actual and enlarges the domain of what is possible.

    20. Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, London, Verso 1986, p. 106

    21. Triangulating Peace, p. 85

    22. Ibid. p. 75

    23. The bedrock of the case for scientific realism of which critical realism is a variant is the argument from the success of science. Most versions of the argument have the following structure:

    SS1: The enterprise of science is much more successful than can be explained as chance. SS2: The only explanation for this success is the truth, which is approximate truth, of scientific theories. SS3: We should, therefore, think as scientific realists.

    Andre Kukla, Studies in Scientific Realism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 12 [explanation added]

    24. I am not distinguishing the broadly empiricist tradition epitomized in traditions stemming from David Hume from an equally broad notion of positivist. Patomaki writes:

    By positivism I mean the set of abstract and closely interrelated ideas such that:

    • causality is about constant conjunction (when A follows, B follows)
    • the properties of entities are independent
    • their relations are external or non-necessary and
    • the basic things of the world are atomist, or at least constant in their inner structural knowledge of it.

    In After International Relations, p. 3 Patomaki remarks that:

    With Bhaskar (1986: p 226), however, I concede that, Most of positivism is already contained and elegantly expounded in the writings of Hume.

    After International Relations, p. 41 Giddens characterizes the traditions that are loosely called positivist as follows:

      First, a conviction that all knowledge is capable of being expressed in terms that refer in an immediate way to some reality, or aspects of reality that can be apprehended through the senses. Second, a faith that the methods and logical form of science, as epitomized in classical physics, can be applied to the study of social phenomena.

    Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 136

    25. Robert Isaak, Managing World Economic Change, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000

    26. I use the phrase — what actually happens — to introduce a description in terms of a neo-Aristotelian theory of human action, rooted in categories drawn from ordinary language. It could be argued that all descriptions are equally theory-laden and that no description has any more right than any other to claim the privilege of naming what actually happens. It could be argued that a description couched in operationally defined terms would be superior to my common sense naming of what actually happens because it would facilitate communication among scientists by specifying the procedures for measuring the phenomenon to be studied. It could be argued that there is no way to tell which of the infinite number of ways any given phenomenon could be described is a good description to start with until one finds out, after doing scientific research, which description leads to the most fruitful results. I do not agree with any of the three arguments that could be made.

    Instead, I claim, agreeing in this respect with Peter Winch, that a description made of common basic words that function in social life, such as — people who own capital move it — has a rightful priority over a description in a technical language devised for scientific purposes. It is the ground level and a place to begin in a more justifiable sense, rather than the atomic facts and protocol sentences of the positivists. As it relates to philosophy, see Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, London: Routledge & Paul, 1958

    27. Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Globalization from Below, Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000, p. 5.

    28. Jeffrey Winter, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996

    29. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936, p. 27

    30. Keynes, quoted by E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, New York: Harper & Row, 1973, p. 20

    31. Triangulating Peace, p. 122

    32. Karin Knorr Cetina, "Objectual Practice," in Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von Savigny eds., The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 184

    33. Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, London: Verso 1986, p. 122-23

    34. Bhaskar, op. cit. p. 123

    35. Jean Piaget, Structuralism, New York: Basic Books, 1970).Piaget discusses the use of the term by Claude Levi-Strauss, Noam Chomsky and many others. Anthony Giddens has discussed social structure, thoroughly. The glossary at the end of his The Constitution of Society defines structuration, structural principles, structural properties, structure and structures, as well as related terms such as system. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 376-377. See also the discussions of structure in his New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies, New York: Harper & Row, 1976; Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Almost all of his books say something about the concept of structure. For critical discussions, see, besides Patomaki, C. G. A. Bryant and D. Jary, editors, Gidden's theory of Structuration: a Critical Appreciation, London: Routledge, 1990; Ira J. Cohen, Structuration Theory: Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of Social Life, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989

    36. After International Relations,  p. 117

    37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, New York: Macmillan, 1953, especially paragraphs: 31, 54, 81-87, 100-103, 133, 146-155 "Rule and Principle," 200-202, 206-08, 227-238, 380

    38. Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1970 Arendt's analysis provides a theoretical account of the ineffectiveness of military hardware where there is no capacity to act in concert. It can almost be said that she described the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades before it happened.

    39. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973

    40. John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, New York, Macmillan 1939, first edition 1924, p. 52-55

    41. After International Relations, p. 113

    42. Ibid. p. 116

    43. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p. 185-86

    44. After International Relations, p. 117

    45. H. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961

    46. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: an Introduction to the International Law of Peace, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 73

    47. M. K. Gandhi in his book My Socialism, Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1959, p. 30

    48. Betty Reardon, Sexism and the War System, New York: Teachers College Press, 1985

    49. After International Relations, p. 158

    50. See the critique of Pareto's (causally efficacious) residues and (ineffective) derivatives in Walter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science. p 103 ff. In agreement with Patomaki and partially in agreement with Winch, I wage a never-ending struggle against a prejudice entrenched in the social sciences since, at least, Condorcet. Thus, it has been assumed that what lends itself to mathematical treatment and/ or analysis in terms of self-interest is deemed material; meanwhile, what lends itself to discussion in natural languages and in the languages of the religious and ethical belief-systems that have guided human cultures is deemed idealistic. I argue that the opposite is, in fact, true: language-guided practice is our material reality and mathematical models are abstract ideas, at least, until they become incorporated into technology.

    51. Although I have made the point that social structures and rules are centrally involved in Patomaki's explanation of social causality, I have not attempted to summarize it. He summarizes it as follows:

    The notions of context and complex form the core of CR methodology. According to definition 1, cause is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the production of a result, as the INUS condition. There are five necessary social components in any causal complex (K) capable of producing events, episodes, tendencies and the like, namely:

    • actors (AR), regulative and constitutive rules (RU),
    • resources as competencies and faculties (RE),
    • relational and positional practices (PRA) and
    • meaningful action (AN). Also, actors and their characteristic logics of action are historically constituted. These related and interdependent components along with the emergent powers and properties of consequent social systems together create the sufficient but unnecessary complex for the production of a result. Hence, there is never a single cause and always a causal complex exists: K = [AR, RU, RE, PRA, AN] perhaps including emergent properties and powers.

    After International Relations, p. 119

    52. Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, p. 36

    53. For explanations of the structural problems encountered by Swedish social democracy see my "The Revenge of the Iron Law of Wages", Part VIII of The Dilemmas of Social Democracies, also here and the works cited there in the footnotes Part IX of After International Relations and the works there cited and, generally, the Marxist literature on regimes of accumulation and their crises discussed and cited by David Harvey in The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990

    Review

    As you see it, what does the rest of Part XI have to do with the introductory quotation? p. 235

    Peace

    1. From Patomaki's book: Deutsch is right in rejecting the so-called realist position: war understood as the product of anarchy among sovereign states.What, if anything, does that description mean to you, in your sense it? p. 239

       b. What comparison do you see with the Deutsch statement and the fact that nine of ten wars are civil war? If you think that the Deutsch needs amending, what would you add, remove or revise?

    2. What provisions for all parties would you include in an accord for a pluralist security community (PSC)? Use the United States, Canada, Mexico and Cuba as a test case, or use your country neighbors in your region. p. 236

       b. Would the need of formal recognition of and by all four countries—be the first requisite basis for a PSC?

       c. What structure do you think the PSC would consist of in its fully functional form?

    3. In your view or sense of values, what role does truth and or Truth play in relation to building peace? p. 239p. 240

    b. Do you see both truth and Truth always as positive peace players?

    c. Based on your sense of human nature, if truth in peace building is vital, why has it been maligned?

    d. In your view, why do some scholars and leaders see truth as unimportant in the peace process?

    1. How would you modify the definitions of truth for its use in the process of building peace?

    e. Who do you see as the participants in peace building who should be held to uphold the truth in the process?

    4. In the prediction peace for a country, the presence of the liberal-Kantian variables of international organization, democracy and trade show that peace will occur. If that list seems incomplete, what other factors would you add to the requisite conditions? p. 242, p. 243

    5. What is your sense of the importance of the main goals of the critical realist 1) returning truth to its logical status as the standard and 2) reorienting the social sciences to engage in a critique of social structures?  p. 240,  p. 243p. 245p. 246,  p. 256p. 270

    6. Perhaps the most important and controversial point of Patomaki's logical plan is that social science research can contribute to peaceful change by a systematic critique of current beliefs. p. 239

    In your view of it, describe the controversial aspect of the social sciences engaged to debunk or defend belief systems.

    Project 12: Patomaki's critical realist approach succeeds in its persuasion that simplistic conclusions should be avoided. In your sense of it, describe the critical realist approach as it applies to building peace in the midst of tension or conflict.

       b. What effect do you see that structure imposes upon the processes of peacemaking and peace building? p. 247

    7. Capital flight is a quasi-natural, expected outcome of the global economy and modernity.

    What role (antagonist, protagonist, central, supporting ...) do you see capital flight playing in the drama of peace, especially within the context of developing and third world economies?

       b. Do you view capital flight as a benign natural fact or more the spirit of "take the money and run." p. 250

    8. In your view of it, describe one or more scenario in which capital flight from a country would be the source of enough tension to cause civil conflict.

    9. What comes to mind in support the idea that capital flight is the culprit of 1) the wealth to poverty disparity and 2) its immediate oppression of workers and consumers. In your view of it, can one occur without the other?

       b. As you see them, describe examples (current, recent, or distant) of civil conflicts caused by the structures that authorize capital flight, wealth to poverty disparity and violation of labor rights and/or human rights.

    10. Would you define the terms capital flight and race to the bottom as two aspects of same phenomenon? p.247

       b. Alternatively, can you see one occurring without the other?

    11. What role do you think that the collusion of corporations and the government play to foster or allow the circumstances for economic tension and conflict? p. 250

    12. How much civil conflict and tension do you think would exist with conditions made unfavorable for capital flight/ roosting? p. 250

    13. How much civil conflict and tension do you think would exist with conditions made unfavorable for capital flight/ roosting? p. 250

    14. If you see it, describe a scenario in which a collusion of capital and government in a true democracy persists unchecked. p. 251

    15. How would you envisage the race to the bottom becoming a—march to the top in which nations cooperate to achieve social and environmental objectives? p. 251

    The race to the bottom: pdf slide show • Race to the bottom: image

    16. What is your sense of the growth imperative as the impetus for leaders in their race to the bottom? p. 253

    17. To what extent does the growth imperative urge capital flight, in your view of it? p. 252

    18. How would you describe a business cure-all for the growth imperative? Hint: two of the three panaceas are advertisement driven, with dire costs to consumers and the Earth. p. 252p. 254

    19. How would you argue to a leader against the growth imperative? Some talking points include: deceptive, counterproductive, intangible goals, unsustainable, no objective and a destructive anti-ethics. p. 253

    20. Maintaining islands of high wages in a "global cesspool" of low wages requires growth year after year and, thus, the endless development of new products. What do you see as the growth or non-growth alternative to growth via new product technologies? p. 247

    21. Research and development for new products requires keeping technological leads and the luring of investors, which is not easy. In your view, what alternative would a country and the world as a whole use instead? p. 61,   p. 68

    In critical realism, the route that prevents the recurrence of holocausts is more than the mere gauging causal factors that are linked to violence.

    22. What first step would you take to stop the threat of genocide or holocaust as part of an imperialist economy? p. 254

       b. What methods or practices are you aware of or engage in to make that first step happen?

       c. Do you think reparations and apologies help, at least in a symbolic sense?

    23. What questions would you ask to determine the structure and design for which a society consists? p. 257

    24. What potential advantages do you see in placing rules as a central theme of a social science? p. 258

    25. The thesis that—power trumps rules seems to be correct from the viewpoint of mainstream political science.  p. 259

    What does it mean to you, what is your opinion of it?

       b. What if any value do you see in the fact that military power trumps rules more easily than economic power?

       c. Do you know an exception to that fact?

       d. What relationship do you think the fact has with the global decline of socialism in the late 20th century, e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union and market reforms in China—both due in part to the cold war? p. 270

    26. Does the bookkeeping rule that defines Homo economicus create a mood that is central to distrust, in your view? If not, then what do you see as central, or how would you express in more concise terms, the core of distrust?  p. 267

    Keywords: accumulation, aggregate demand, capital flight, capitalism, causal power, causality, critical realism, double hermeneutics, economic growth, economic power, empiricism, explanation, freedom, growth imperative, globalization, government, hermeneutics, holocaust, Homo economicus, human action, Humean, macroeconomics, meanings, modern world-system, nation state, nonviolence, peace studies, peace, positivist, poverty, power, practices, productive power, profit, property rights,relations, responsiveness, rule of law, rulessatyagraha, secondary rules, security community, self-interest, social democracy, social planning, social product, social structures, spiritual conversion, structural problems, structural transformation, structuration, structure, Sweden, truth, understanding, violence, wages

    Description: A Logical Plan for Peace examines the tie between violence, imperialist war and the global economy. It is the synthesis of other studies in global peace research with the author's. It adds the work and writings of current and past scholars and public figures. It shows the illogic of war and violence whilst suggesting that the strength of love has the power of virtue at least equal to the abuse of power behind violence. This frames Part XI as a summation and extension of Understanding the Global Economy, 1) an expose of the economic rise and rule of free trade as enforced by trade in pacts between corporations and central governments and 2) a source for building an ethical, sustainable economy based on knowledge and research. 

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    Global Political Economy Commission IPRAGPEC
    forum issues of, solutions to the economy,
    results of the IPRA 2010 Conference,
      goals for the IPRA 2012 Conference,
      events, call for papers and action on global markets.